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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 In this paper, it is argued that theoretical physics is more akin 
to an organism than to a rigid structure. It is in this sense that the 
epithet, “sick”, applies to it. It is argued that classical physics is a 
model of a healthy science, and the degree of sickness of modern 
physics is measured accordingly. The malady is located in the 
relationship between mathematics and physical meaning in 
physical theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Increasingly, and as a concerned physicist delves deeper into 
modern physical theory, and exerts a genuine effort to understand 
what is going on in theoretical physics, he or she cannot help 
thinking that something is deeply amiss in modern physics; that it 
is afflicted with some sort of a malady or sickness that could 
threaten its very credibility. It is a feeling that could not be 
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dispelled easily. One smells corruption in the air of modern 
theoretical physics. But, of course, this feeling implies that 
theoretical physics is some sort of a socio--epistemological 
organism. Are we justified-- logically, conceptually and 
historically-- in talking about physics in this strain, as though it 
were an organism? If so, where is the malady located? In what 
sense is modern physics sick? And, what is the cure? 
 
 In this paper, we argue that physical theory is indeed an 
organism -- a socio-epistemological organism -- that is born, and 
that lives, flourishes, and declines under various internal and 
external conditions. We, then, focus our attention on the 
relationship between mathematics and physical meaning in 
physical theory, and argue that classical physics is a paragon of 
health in this regard. In contrast, modern physical theory, 
particularly general relativity and quantum mechanics, suffers from 
a serious disjuncture between mathematics and physical meaning, 
which opens it to a barrage of absurdities and pre-scientific 
mystifications. This malady is not showing any sign of abating. On 
the contrary, it is growing at an alarming rate, which threatens the 
efficacy and the very existence of theoretical physics as a rational 
enterprise. The paper ends with a note of warning to the theoretical 
physics community to ponder this malady and effect fundamental 
changes in their methodology before the situation gets out of hand 
(Lindley, 1994). 
 
Physics as Organism  
 
The fundamental question that pertains to the nature of 
physical theory is the question concerning the interconnections 
between physical theories in the modern era. Are physical theories 
a heap of independent thought systems, each with a unique 
structure reminiscent of a work of art? Are they free creations of 
the mind; leaps of creativity that emanate from a semi-rational 
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subterranean realm of consciousness? Are they closed conceptual 
universes, each with a unique logic of its own? 
 
 
    The prevalent trend in modern physics and 20th century 
philosophy of science tends to answer the above questions in the 
affirmative. Physicists and philosophers of science, as varied and 
wide apart as the positivists (Reichenbach, 1970; Reichenbach, 
1958), Karl Popper (Popper, 1986), Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 1970), 
Paul Feyerabend (Feyerabend, 1995), Gaston Bachelard 
(Bachelard, 1984), Werner Heisenberg (Heisenberg, 1966; 
Heisenberg, 1958)), and Stephen Hawking (Hawking, 1988), seem 
to share many views pertaining to these questions. To them, 
modern physical theories are not organically related to each other, 
but are at best contingently related. The similarities between 
modern physical theories are dismissed as being superficial, verbal 
- merely verbal – similarities. Each theory stands on its own, and 
comes about (I have deliberately avoided the word, “emerges”) as 
a result of a creative irrational leap, be it individual (Popper) 
(Bhaskar, 1978) or social (Kuhn) (Ghassib, 1994a). It is an eternal 
present, unrelated either to its past or its future. The fundamental 
concepts that are common to the various theories, such as: mass, 
particle, field, Lagrangian, and Hamiltonian, are, in fact, nominally 
common; only the names, not the conceptual contents, are 
common. Thus, modern physical theories are merely a collection of 
essentially contingently related thought systems and ideas.  
 
                     In opposition to the current wisdom regarding the nature of 
physical theory, we propose a different approach, which views 
modern theoretical physics ever since its emergence during the 17th 
century from the heart of medieval metaphysics, as an organism, as 
a contradictory open totality, which evolves and develops, 
ultimately via leaps and revolutions. According to this dialectical 
approach (Ghassib, 1994b), modern physical theories are 
dialectically related to each other, which means that they are 
related via necessary transformational objective relations. The 
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                 In a previous publication (Ghassib, 1988), I located the 
fundamental objective contradiction, that has animated physics 
since its inception in the 17th century, in the contradiction between 
the classical concepts of particle and field. Initially, this 
contradiction manifested itself in embryonic form in the two self-
contradictory concepts of ether and action-at-a-distance (Palter, 
1960). These were embryonic substitutes for the fully developed 
concept of field. However, the moment the latter emerged in its 
fullness in the second half of the 19th century, it had to rip classical 
physics apart and expose it to a deep revolutionary crisis. This 
fundamental contradiction was partially resolved by special 
relativity (Miller, 1986; Miller, 1977), Einstein’s photon theory of 
light (Einstein, 1905; Jammer, 1966), general relativity (D'Abro, 
1950), de Broglie’s theory of matter waves (Ghassib, 1983), and 
Schrodinger’s wave mechanics (Ludwig, 1968). However, these 
partial resolutions have helped to reproduce this basic 
contradiction in various new forms, which means that it is still 
animating physical theory and its development. This implies that 
modern physical theories are not various creative, basically 
unrelated, conceptual systems created to cope with data and unify 
them. They are closer to being ways to cope with contradictions 
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lying at the heart of prevalent theories; ways to transform existing 
theories into more comprehensive theories by resolving the 
contradictions of the former. It is in this sense that we have come 
to consider physical theory an organism, rather than a collection of 
ideas. Since physical theories emerge from each other and are 
transformed into each other, they cannot be severed from each 
other, and, thus, constitute an organic whole, a developing 
organism, an open  totality  (Ghassib, 1992). 
 
      Hitherto, two general methods have been invariably followed 
to resolve the basic contradictions of physical theory: (i) the 
reductionist method, (ii) the dialectical method. The reductionist 
method has invariably failed and reached an impasse, whilst the 
dialectical method has proven to be very fruitful, even though it 
has not yet totally resolved the basic contradiction. The 
reductionist method consists in reducing particles to fields, or vice’ 
versa. At the turn of the 20th century, this was followed by a 
number of physicists who attempted to reduce classical particles to 
electromagnetic fields. Amongst them were J.J. Thomson (Ghassib, 
1988), Oliver Heaviside (Ghassib, 1988), Wilhelm Wien (Ghassib, 
1988), Max Abraham (Ghassib, 1988), and Lorentz. Their failure 
led Einstein along the dialectical route on to special relativity. 
However, Einstein himself was later to fall into the reductionist 
trap in his thirty-year relentless effort to create a comprehensive 
unified field theory that would resolve the contradictions of general 
relativity (Weinberg, 1992). It was a wasted quest. Meanwhile, 
physical theory has evolved to forms that bear scant resemblance 
to Eintein’s dream .  
 
        If we subscribe to this viewpoint and consider physical theory 
a socio - epistemological organism, we are bound to consider the 
question of the state of health of physical theory a legitimate 
question. We shall approach this question by focusing on the role 
of mathematics in physical theory, and, particularly, on the 
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relationship between mathematics and physical meaning in the 
major physical theories of the modern era . 
 
Classical Physics   
 
 
           In classical physics, the relationship between mathematics 
and physical meaning is transparent and straight-forward. The 
essential point to notice in this regard is that classical physics uses 
mathematics to express physical and related philosophical concepts 
and meanings, which means that the physical meaning precedes the 
mathematical expression. The mathematics is part of the physical 
meaning, and not the other way round. For example, force is given 
a specific meaning based on a broad conception of the material 
world. It is viewed as a measure of material interaction between 
fundamental particles (atoms), and as the primary cause of change 
in the motion of atoms, and, thus, of all phenomena in the universe. 
Its properties are empirically determined, and mathematics is then 
used to unify and give expression to these properties (Cohen, 
1983). The physical meaning is given mathematical expression 
because the former is fundamentally quantitative. The mathematics 
is not inseparable from the physical meaning; it is a necessary 
component of, and tool for constructing, the meaning. Newtonian 
mechanics is, therefore, a healthy coherent theory; a clear and 
distinct embodiment of a specific rationality and reason. It is based 
on a clear-cut family of philosophies of nature and a special broad 
conception, and it consists of a network of meanings and meaning 
systems, which underlies theoretical and empirical practices. The 
mathematics is part and parcel of this network and its scientific 
specificity. 
 
       The other disciplines of classical physics, which were modeled 
and based on classical mechanics, are no less clear, distinct and 
meaningful. The electric and magnetic fields had been discovered 
and physically defined before Maxwell formulated his differential 
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equations for the electromagnetic field (Jammer1980). The latter 
are mathematical expressions of physical relations between 
physically well-defined entities. Likewise with thermodynamics 
and the theory of matter. In classical physics, the equations come 
as the climax of a process of meaning and knowledge construction, 
the basic tools of which are mathematics and measurement 
(experiment). Thus, classical equations are the highest stage of 
physical meaning construction. Where they are used to investigate 
new phenomena, they are indeed used as a tool for knowing, 
understanding and explaining these phenomena – i.e., for 
determining their essential structures, causes and mechanisms of 
generation. Their use is essentially a search for their concrete 
manifestation in the phenomena. This process deepens our 
knowledge of the equations and sheds more light on their efficacy, 
extent and significance. Thus, theory and phenomenon are 
dialectically related. However, there is an asymmetry in this 
relationship. It is the theory that is used to understand the 
phenomenon, and not the other way round. The theory is enriched 
and its meaning deepened and concretized by this process, but the 
process is not essential for conferring meaning on the theory, or, 
for gaining a basic understanding of it. That explains the perfect 
balance between theory and experiment in classical physics. 
Theory grows in parallel with experiment. The element of 
collaboration, coordination and cooperation between them is more 
pronounced than the element of antagonistic imbalance. Classical 
physics is indeed a sane, rationalist enterprise. 
 
 
Special and General Relativity  
 
Modern physics (relativity and quantum mechanics) is an 
altogether different story. The balance, the relative harmony, 
hitherto encountered in classical physics, is violently severed in 
modern, 20th century, physics. Now, the equation precedes the 
physical meaning. It is discovered prior to physical meaning, using 
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very abstract mathematical arguments and relations. The search for 
meaning starts after the discovery of the equation and continues 
seemingly indefinitely. Experiment, philosophy and hypothesis are 
all utilized to discover the missing physical meaning. The only 
objective reality practically recognized is the uninterpreted 
mathematical equation; a clear return to Pythagorean-Platonic 
thinking (Heisenberg, 1971). The equation is the only objective 
fact. All else is subjectivity.  
 
          Needless to say, it all starts with the maestro of modern 
physics, Albert Einstein. This Pythagorean trend is evident right 
from the start, even in special relativity, that indispensable tool of 
modern investigation. The special retativistic transformation 
(Lorentz) equations are first derived, and then given a number of 
physical interpretations. The controversy, of course, is not yet over. 
The energy-mass equation is first mathematically derived, using 
the solid methods of classical mechanics, and later on interpreted 
physically. A mathematical, four-dimensional, space is constructed 
(Minkowski’s spacetime), and its mathematical properties and 
symmetries are used to reconstruct classical mechanics special 
relativistically. The physical interpretation comes later, of course 
not without the help of the “discarded’’ classical mechanics. Thus, 
modern physics is mathematics in search of physical meaning. It 
has indeed been reduced to a branch of mathematics.  
 
            What is a barely noticeable trend in special relativity 
assumes enormous proportions and the status of a fundamental 
principle in Einstein’s general relativity -- namely, the principle of 
covariance. The coordinates lose all specific physical meaning, and 
the laws of physics are constructed out of tensors on a four-
dimensional manifold in which real space and real time are 
dissolved beyond recognition. The abstract engulfs the concrete 
and consumes it beyond retrieval. Being covariant, the laws of 
physics are constructed in such a way that they are impervious and 
indifferent to the choice of coordinate system. In constructing his 
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field equations, Einstein was guided as much by mathematical 
considerations as by physical grounds. His search focused on 
finding a tensor which satisfied certain mathematical (geometric) 
criteria, which he then equated with an ambiguous generalization 
of classical mass and energy (energy - momentum tensor) (Schilpp, 
1951). Admittedly, the Einstein field equations did (and do) have a 
broad geometrico-physical meaning embedded in them-- namely, 
spacetime curvature is related to matter and motion. However, this 
apriori assignation of meaning is rather deceptive. When it comes 
to solving the Einstein field equations, one is immediately 
confronted with the choice of a suitable coordinate system and the 
physical interpretation of the system chosen (Fok). Needless to say, 
recourse in invariably made to classical mechanics to interpret 
certain fundamental constants in the theory (e.g., Newton’s 
universal gravitational constant, G, and the mass density) 
(Eddington, 1965). Also, finding a suitable coordinate system and 
interpreting it reasonably are no straight-forward matter. It is a 
very laborious process which relies heavily on the clear and 
distinct ideas of classical physics. This is most clearly evident in 
the history of the Schwarzschild solution to Einstein’s field 
equations (Israel, 1987). It took the best minds of the scientific 
community more than thirty years after Schwarzschild’s discovery 
to arrive at a “natural” coordinate system (the Kruskal-Szekeres 
system) (Misner, 1971), and a tolerably reasonable interpretation of 
it. Meanwhile, the whole matter led to such real and apparent 
absurdities that no one working in the field at the time, least of all 
Einstein and Eddington, made heads or tails (apart from the 
mathematics, of course) of what one was actually doing. However, 
even after the major discoveries of Kruskal, Szekeres, Kerr, 
Wheeler, Penrose, Hawking, Zeldovich, Novikov, Ellis, Israel and 
others (Misner, 1971),  the majority of theoretical physicists still 
feel rather lost when it comes to physically understand black hole 
and wormhole physics. The mathematics is pretty clear, though 
heavy, but the physics is lost in the mathematical entanglement. In 
spite of the apparent experimental successes of general relativity, 
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one is left with an uneasy feeling of intangibility and contrivance 
(Dunbar, 1996).  
 
             Contrary to the myth propagated by a number of 20th 
century philosophers of science, general relativity is not a 
“beautiful” self-contained and self-sufficient theory -- a finished 
work of art (Bachelard, 1984). Rather, and like all other physical 
theories, it is a contradictory open totality, which is heavily 
dependent on classical theory in both form and content. In a sense, 
it is a field (as opposed to particle) generalization of classical 
theory (Einstein, 1961; Einstein, 1950). Being afflicted with the 
malady of building its mathematical equations before establishing 
physical meanings, it is bound to be heavily dependent on classical 
physics in its search for physical meaning.  
 
Quantum Mechanics  
 
      This malady reaches absurd proportions in quantum mechanics. 
Once again, a myth has been propagated, by both theoretical 
physicists and philosophers of science, to the effect that quantum 
mechanics is a complete theory, which has solved the 
contradictions, and overcome the inadequacies, of the old quantum 
theory. But, has it really done that? Is it less inadequate and 
contradictory than the old quantum theory? Is it not more prudent 
to recognize its incompleteness and inadequacies, and look for 
ways to “develop” it back towards, rather than away from, the 
great insights of classical physics? 
 
         Instead, we have seen leading theoretical physicists trying to 
enthrone quantum mechanics and elevate it to the status of “the” 
complete theory of physics (Cushing, 1994). Of course, to conceal 
its glaring inadequacies, they have had to invite all sorts of absurd 
ideas and interpretations. In the process, they have opened large 
holes in the edifice of physics for all sorts of pre-scientific and 
irrationalist, almost solipsistic, nonsense. How else would a 
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rationalist describe the Copenhagen assertion that the conscious 
observer (consciousness) creates external material reality (Mermin, 
1985; Popper, 1982), that the humanly willful and purposeful act 
of measurement creates microscopic reality (Landau, 1965), that 
each event splits the universe into many universes (Everett III, 
1957), or, that the present fixes the past (Wheeler, 1957). These 
absurdities satirized by Schrodinger with his famous cat 
(Schrodinger, 1935; Beller, 1977), are, in fact, rooted in the 
aforementioned malady of modern physics -- namely, that the 
mathematics precedes the physical meaning and conditions it; that 
the latter is a mere aftereffect or epiphenomenon.  
 
When Schrodinger discovered his equation, he thought that 
he was discovering a new type of classical field, and that its nature 
would be specified later in a manner similar to the way the optical 
wave–field, discovered by Huygens, Young and Fresnel, was later 
shown to be Maxwell’s electromagnetic field (Harman, 1995). Of 
course, things have not developed in this way, and, already, almost 
ninety years have passed since the construction of quantum 
mechanics, and no convincing interpretation seems to be in sight 
(Squires, 1996).  
 
 This state of affairs applies equally to the other formulations 
of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg started with an insistence on 
observables (D'Abro, 1952), and ended up endorsing a form of 
solipsism, whereby the laws of quantum physics do not reflect 
physical reality, but a mental state (our possible knowledge) 
(Heisenberg, 1960; Heisenberg, 1961). The same dilemma recurs 
in Wigner’s formulation of quantum mechanics (Wigner, 1932). In 
classical transport theory, the distribution function is first defined 
and assigned a specific meaning, and the Liouville equation is then 
derived by translating the physical meaning into mathematical 
operations (Jancel, 1963). Thus, the Liouville equation is a 
mathematical embodiment, or, rather, a development, of the 
physical meaning. In quantum transport theory, the opposite 
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occurs. The Wigner distribution function is defined only 
mathematically, in terms of the ill-defined Schrodinger wave 
function, and the Schrodinger equation is used to derive the 
quantum Wigner equation (Ghassib, 1996). The never-ending 
search for physical meaning starts after the equation is specified. 
Needless to say, this search is principally guided by the 
“discarded” classical Liouville equation. Once again, we have an 
equation in search of physical meaning (Planck, 1933; Lewontin, 
1993). We have a fictional phase space unrelated to real events, 
and we have a physically indefinite distribution function 
mathematically defined on it. The latter seems to be a mere 
calculational device devoid of physical meaning. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
The foregoing analysis raises a number of urgent questions 
which should be confronted by modern theoretical physics. Can it 
be that the very methods of modern theoretical physics, as opposed 
to classical theoretical physics, are at fault? Is it rationally 
permissible to construct equations for physically undefined, ill-
defined or incomprehensible mathematical constructs? Was the 
path connecting classical physics to modern physics inevitable       
-- i.e., written in the heart of the theoretical physics organism? Or, 
could this sickness have been avoided? Was it the result of an 
ideological intervention that managed to deflect physics from its 
true, healthy path? Should modern theoretical physicists not slow 
down their feverish, frenzied competition to ponder, and rethink, 
the methods they have been employing for the last ninety years? 
Should they not revise these methods and their results in 
relationship to classical theoretical physics? Should they not carry 
out a rigorous ideological analysis of their enterprise, and learn the 
critical methods of the social sciences? Should they not relearn 
how to think?(53)  
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We tend to answer these questions in the affirmative, and we 
leave them standing as a warning sign to the theoretical physics 
community.  
 
In future publications, we intend to develop the principal 
ideas propounded in this paper in relation to recent developments 
in quantum gravity, superstring theory and quantum cosmology. 
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